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ARAB AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL  
DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE  
ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE

by

Robert L. Harbaugh

A Thesis  
Submitted to the  
Faculty of The Graduate College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Arts  
Department of Political Science

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Robert L. Harbaugh

ARAB AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL  
DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE  
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Robert L. Harbaugh, M.A.

Western Michigan University, 2002

Unlike other ethnic communities in the U.S., such as the Jewish and Hispanic communities, the political power of the Arab American community is largely unknown. Therefore, one manner to gain insight into the political power of Arab Americans is to study the interest groups that represent their ethnic community. This study uses the Arab American Institute as the leading Arab American interest group.

The study recognizes that there are three important variables to determining Arab American influence. The first is voting and is not examined in this study. The second two, which are examined, are direct lobbying on Congress and political action committee contributions to candidates for public office. Using interviews with staff of members of Congress and data from the Federal Elections Commission, the study is able to determine the level of influence of the Arab American Institute on Congress.

The findings of the study are mixed. The interviews with the Congressional staffers reveal that even though they have different perceptions of Arab American interest groups, a common theme emerge that suggests that this community has little influence on members of Congress. Yet, the results of the PAC contributions yield a different result. The findings point out that members of Congress, who have received campaign contributions from a PAC associated with the Arab American Institute, are far more likely to vote in a manner favorable to the position of the Arab American Institute.

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## INTRODUCTION

“Liberty is to faction what air is to fire.”  
-James Madison, *Federalist #10*

The American political process is a complex web of institutions that make up the public policy process. It ranges from the Congress to the executive and to interest groups. Even the judicial branch plays a role in public policy that only makes the process more complicated for individuals to navigate. The policy process and the institutions involved will more often than not make it nearly impossible for an individual person to effectively influence public policy on the issues that they care about.

The difficulty for an individual to be an effective advocate for their cause forces them to work together with other individuals in hopes of achieving greater sway in the public policy debate. This cooperative venture between individuals leads to what we call an “interest group.” A simple, but eloquent definition of an interest group comes from Jeffrey Berry: “Interest groups are organizations that are not part of the government they are trying to influence.”<sup>1</sup> Clearly, with this definition we can see the purpose of interest groups is to influence the government, in effect influence the public policy process. A group is more likely to be effective at influencing how a member of Congress views a piece of legislation than an individual will be.

The earlier definition of interest groups allows us to understand the purpose of the organization and that it is not a government agency. Yet, it does not provide us with an explicit understanding of the types of interest groups involved in the public policy process. Interest groups are more varied than the simple idea of people working together

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<sup>1</sup> Jeffrey M. Berry. *The Interest Group Society*, 3d ed. New York: Longman, 1997. 4-5.

for a common policy concern. Jeff Berry points out in his book, *The Interest Group Society*, that corporations and public interest law firms do not have memberships, but they do have constituencies that they represent.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, they are representing the *interests* of their constituency much like the National Rifle Association (NRA) represents the interests of its membership. The key point to be understood is that interest groups represent an *interest*; whether it be for a membership or a corporation is no different.

The very concept of interest groups has existed in American politics from the very founding of this nation. James Madison dedicated an entire essay from the Federalist Papers to a discussion on factions. He used Federalist Paper #10 to wage a lengthy argument on the dangers, origins, and remedies to what he defined as a faction. Madison understood a faction as being,

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.<sup>3</sup>

While this definition is not the one we are using for this paper, it clearly operates along the lines of the definition provided by Berry. Groups cooperate when they share the same interest in order to reach a common goal. Madison saw factions, as he referred to them, as being a natural outgrowth of liberty. Because we have liberty, we will have factions. Therefore, to remove factions we would be required to abolish liberty, which Madison saw as an unacceptable alternative to controlling factions.<sup>4</sup>

Madison argued that the greatest cause of factions was property, “But the most

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>3</sup> James Madison. *The Federalist Papers*. ed. Clinton Rossiter. New York: Mentor, 1961. 78.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 78.

common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.”<sup>5</sup> Arguably, the causes of why interests groups form has grown beyond the issue of property to include such things as health care and tax code reform. Nevertheless, factions formed from a common interest, property. Those who had it formed into one interest group and those who didn’t formed into another interest group.

According to Madison, the best way to remedy the problems of factions, which include distrust between individuals that lead to the downfall of government, is by creating a republic.<sup>6</sup> An elected government that is representative of the people is the best measure for controlling the effects of factions. The body of lawmakers will be best equipped to prevent a tyrannical majority or even a minority from unfairly exerting its will upon the rest of the country. Combine the national government with that of state and local governments and all citizens will be both well represented and the lawmakers will be capable of hearing what the interests of the citizenry include.<sup>7</sup>

As I have already pointed out, interest groups in America are concerned with more than just issues of property. Interest groups now include what is known as ethnic interest groups. The role of these groups is to represent the concerns of their ethnic membership or ethnic constituency group. They may represent their ethnic group on a variety of matters before the government, ranging from civil rights legislation to foreign policy concerns.

The foreign policy concerns of many ethnic interest groups (I will also refer to them as ethnic lobbies interchangeably) are in direct relation to their ancestral homeland. James Lindsay points out that many foreign governments use their ethnic lobby

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 77-81.

counterpart in the U.S. to hopefully influence American foreign policy, “Visiting Armenian, Greek, Israeli, and Mexican officials routinely meet with fellow ethnics to enlist their support.”<sup>8</sup> The fact that foreign officials might try to use these American ethnic lobbies as tools for their own agenda might be cause for concern to U.S. policy makers. Yet, Lindsay rejects that concept on the grounds that they provide a much-needed foreign perspective to the foreign policy debates the government might be engaged in.<sup>9</sup>

The Arab American community is a growing ethnic community in the United States and presents several very interesting questions about their role in influencing American policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, this paper will seek to be a case study in understanding ethnic interests groups using the Arab-American Institute (AAI) as the basis for my research.

In order to provide a clearer picture of the Arab American community, I will provide some demographic data that can help us to understand this ethnic group. First, there are approximately 3 million Arab Americans who live throughout the United States. Of these 3 million, approximately 47% are Lebanese, while only 6% are Palestinian. Further, overwhelming majorities of Arab Americans are Christian, of which 42% is Catholic. Only 23% of the Arab American community is Muslim.<sup>10</sup> Not only do these types of demographic breakdowns make the Arab American community interesting to study, but their potential political influence also makes them fascinating. 66% of Arab

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 82-83.

<sup>8</sup> James Lindsay. “Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s Foreign Style.” *Brookings Review* 20, no. 1 (2002): 37-40. Available from <http://www.brook.edu>; (Accessed April 8, 2002.) 5. Internet.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>10</sup> Arab American Institute, “Demographics.” Available from <http://www.aaiusa.org>; (Accessed September 3, 2002.) Internet.

Americans live in just 10 states. 33% of their population lives in three politically key states, California, Michigan, and New York.<sup>11</sup> This could make them politically important in elections especially if Michigan continues to be a swing state during presidential elections.

The next step to understand how interest groups operate will be to provide a review of the existing literature in the field. In the course of this review I will use scholars such as Jack Walker to provide us with a broad definition of what types of interest groups exist. The next step will be to use John Tierney to narrow down that typology of interest groups even further by examining what types of interest groups exist in the foreign policy community. The review will proceed with broader examinations of what interest groups do to gain influence, including whether they use an “inside” or an “outside” strategy, and other important aspects of the interest group literature.

I do not intend for this paper to become a debate as to whether or not ethnic lobbies are beneficial or not to productive U.S. foreign policy debates. Yet, I do intend to evaluate how ethnic lobbies achieve their influence and more specifically the role and success or lack thereof, of the Arab American lobby in the United States.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Jack Walker provides some historical perspective on the development of interest groups in American politics in relation to the role and development of political parties in his essay “The Mobilization of Political Interests in America,” from his book *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. Walker makes a significant contribution with this essay on the different types of interest groups that have evolved over time.

First, there are occupational interest groups that can be divided into profit or nonprofit groups. Walker points out that these two “subgroups” have historically formed separate associations from each other and not really combined to form one association containing both profit and nonprofit members. Further, Walker also points out that business interests have traditionally been formed to protect against perceived government interference in their operations.<sup>12</sup>

Second, are government-sponsored interest groups. Essentially, the government acts as the original patron of an interest group in formulating its organization and then they develop on their own with some help. Walker has multiple examples of interest groups that were originally government sponsored. He cites the National Rifle Association (NRA) being formed by the Department of the Army and the American Farm Bureau Federation being created by the Department of Agriculture.<sup>13</sup> The government is able to not only form interest groups that it sees as beneficial, but is able to encourage the

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<sup>12</sup> Jack L. Walker, Jr. “The Mobilization of Political Interests in America,” in *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*, by Jack L. Walker, Jr., 19-40. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000) 28.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

development and growth of many other interest groups by providing tax-free gifts, postal rate subsidies, grants, and even some government contracts are available to an interest group promoting their financial well-being.<sup>14</sup>

The last type of interest group is the most relevant to the Arab-American Institute and their endeavors, citizen groups. This is the type of group that is open to all regardless of their religion, occupation, etc. Citizen groups are interest groups based on a single or limited number of issues important to them.<sup>15</sup> They have experienced major growth in the recent past that has been aided by a number of things:

With the growth of a large, well-educated middle class since World War II, and the development of many new techniques of carefully targeted mass communication, such as computerized mailing systems, closed-circuit video conferences, and toll-free telephone lines, it has become possible to organize large, highly dispersed formations of citizens united only by their dedication to a cause or common beliefs about the appropriate direction of public policy.<sup>16</sup>

This is important to understanding the growth of interest groups because these types of techniques not only allows for groups to organize, it also makes fundraising more accessible to the interest group which is important if they want to achieve their desired goals.

John Tierney provides for an interesting discussion concerning interest groups in his essay, "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy." Tierney explores the different types of interest groups that have taken on a role in regards to foreign and defense policy. He broadly outlines these groups into five categories: American economic interests, advocacy and cause groups, ethnic groups, foreign

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 32-33.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 34.

governments, and finally foreign economic interests. These broad categories of Tierney's are directly related to the even broader categories of Walker's. For example, Tierney identifies both domestic and foreign economic interests, which are within the business category set forth by Walker. These outlines are important because they allow us to understand the broad scope of the different interests involved in the foreign policy interest group community. After he outlines the types of groups he proceeds to examine their effectiveness by using the case studies of trade policy and arms control.

Tierney describes American economic interests as being both U.S. corporations and labor organizations. American corporations tend to represent their own individual interests before Congress and work with industry associations when the need arises for an effort by the entire industry community. Tierney cites the work of what he refers to as "peak business associations," an example being the Chamber of Commerce, as working to benefit all business and industries on a variety of matters including foreign trade as one example.<sup>17</sup>

Advocacy and cause groups are also one of Tierney's categories of interest groups. These groups tend to be associated with "public interest groups." These groups tend to be made up of citizens and not corporations. Therefore, they work in the desired interests of their members.<sup>18</sup> Examples of such groups include Green Peace, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Amnesty International. The work of these advocacy groups is varied across the spectrum of international issues as my examples indicate. These groups are broad in number and purpose.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> John Tierney. "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy." In *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill*, ed. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, 89-111. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993. 91.



A third category is ethnic groups. According to Tierney, the work done by ethnic lobbies is “on behalf of many different racial, cultural, and religious subgroups in the American population.”<sup>19</sup> Tierney points out that the influence of ethnic lobbies depends on two crucial factors. The first is that the policy they are promoting not conflict with U.S. security interests. Secondly, the ethnic group must be assimilated enough into American society to identify themselves as Americans, but not so assimilated as to lose their ethnic identity.<sup>20</sup>

The final two categories comprise foreign governments and foreign economic interests. Tierney discusses both categories under the same heading, but I assert that they represent two closely connected, but separate, interest groups. Foreign governments have established a lobbying presence in Washington that goes beyond their traditional diplomatic efforts. While the use of diplomatic officials is still an active strategy employed by foreign governments, they have now acquired the services of “highly regarded Americans to be their lobbyists in Washington.”<sup>21</sup> Foreign governments have been providing the lead that their corporations have been following by using Americans to lobby on their behalf before Congress. Tierney notes that these foreign economic interests have created a strong lobbying presence in Washington, by creating the necessary relationships to insure influence and access.<sup>22</sup>

After Tierney identifies the interests involved in working to shape or influence Congressional decision-making, the next step for him is to ask how to measure that influence. Tierney is very clear that determining influence is no easy task and that is very

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

problematic for a researcher. Instead of asking how much influence an interest group has, Tierney asks, "...*what difference* its efforts made."<sup>23</sup> In effect this question Tierney uses to assess influence is meant to find out if an interest group's influence can make a defeat less damaging to their goals or if they can achieve a complete victory on legislation that is important to them for either passage or defeat. Therefore, Tierney alters how to assess the effectiveness of these interest groups by examining a variety of different factors.

The factors that Tierney now explores are the means to answer his question concerning influence. He makes clear that these interest groups have different levels of consideration based upon the situation. Interest groups have little influence during times of crises. They also have less influence on those issues that have attracted significant public interest and led to deep divisions with the public and/or political ideologies. Thus, interest groups are most likely to impact those issues that are not in the public view and do not cause significant political rifts. Also, they are more likely to have an effect when they resist change to existing policies rather than to try to enact change.<sup>24</sup>

Foreign and defense policy interest groups do share some things in common with domestic policy groups, their need to effectively marshal their resources together and apply them with equal effectiveness. According to Tierney,

Especially important are the possession of substantive information and defensible policy rationales but also crucial are resources such as money, an appealing cause, a skillful staff, an attentive membership widely dispersed across many congressional districts, and strategically placed allies among policymakers in government.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 98. Emphasis is from the original author.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 98-99.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 99.

With these types of resources in place and being used effectively, an interest group has an opportunity to impact policy decisions. The list Tierney provides is by no means an end-all list of what makes an interest group effective, but it is the foundation of an effective interest group and without these resources an interest group will not fare well in impacting policies.

With an understanding of the make-up of interest groups and how to measure influence, Tierney provides two alternative case studies in which to test his theory, trade and national security. Tierney briefly reminds us that trade has historically been an issue that the Congress addressed, but that role shifted to the executive in 1934, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. This law allowed Congress to shift the blame to the executive when economic policies went awry, leaving them in the politically desirable position of not being at fault. Congress generally shied away from trade policy until the mid-1980's when ballooning trade deficits caught their attention along with other changes developing on the international economic scene.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, with a growing involvement on the part of Congress in trade policy, economic groups were again prone to try to use their influence to affect the decisions of Congress. Tierney points to the work of Pietro Nivola in explaining how Congress affects trade policy. Nivola points out that Congress does not tend to make broad sweeping legal changes, but instead makes incremental changes to existing law.<sup>27</sup> Interest groups are able to achieve these "victories" on trade policies by using a variety of tactics to achieve their

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 100-101.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 102. From Pietro S. Nivola, "Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field." In *A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas E. Mann. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1990.

goal, but the most effective tactic is "...substantive information and defensible policy rationales, which are the real political currencies on the Hill."<sup>28</sup>

Tierney next turns to a case study of national security policy, specifically arms control and defense spending decisions by Congress. Tierney specifically examines the role of the nuclear freeze activists of the 1980's and their impact on Congress. He claims that they made use of every political tool available to them. These included PAC contributions, massive grassroots campaigning, and gaining media attention.<sup>29</sup> They were able to gain influence by using these tools and making a difference in Congressional elections in 1982. This all lead to a passage of a nuclear freeze resolution in the U.S. House, but failed to win in the Senate. The nuclear freeze movement fell apart as a viable political power by 1985.<sup>30</sup>

He also briefly examines the case study of defense spending in regards to interest group involvement. He points out that Congress has undergone dramatic changes in regards to how it sets the budget for defense spending. This includes budget reform processes in the mid-1970's to the drastic scale back of defense spending dollars in the 1990's. Defense interests have used lobbyists and spending millions in campaign contributions to achieve their desired results for their defense companies. Defense contractors are not the only interests involved in regards to military weapons, as public interests groups have also taken an active role in weapons debates.<sup>31</sup>

Tierney concludes his study with some important observations for how things have changed with how Congress makes its decisions. First, interest groups not only

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 106-107.

affect outcomes, but are also “affected by the larger institutional and political settings.”<sup>32</sup> Secondly, because of the reforms Congress has made that make it more decentralized, it has created numerous ways for interest groups to be able to influence its decision-making. Essentially, no one person or committee chair has absolute authority anymore. This is also important because the increased number of foreign and defense policy interest groups is a response to the increased role of Congress in making decisions on these matters.<sup>33</sup> Tierney points out that this is likely to make interests groups more aggressive and make for more polarized politics.<sup>34</sup> Tierney’s work is important because it recognizes that fundamental changes have occurred with how Congress addresses foreign and defense policy. Those fundamental changes have created a vast network of interest groups that seek to have their voices heard and influence felt on Capitol Hill. Further, changes will also be occurring in the future, we may not know exactly what those changes are, but we can expect them.

Tony Smith did one of the best studies of ethnic interest group participation in the United States in his book *Foreign Attachments*, where he examines ethnic interest groups and their role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. In his book, Smith presents three major proposals. The first is that ethnic interest groups are more involved in the political process than widely perceived. Secondly, their activities may have more negative effects than positive ones. Finally, there are complex problems caused by a pluralist democracy. Those complex problems raise the simpler question, how to balance the rights and

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 110.

interests of the few against the many.<sup>35</sup> Smith very smoothly sums up the results of his proposals:

These three findings dovetail nicely: because ethnic group influence is underappreciated and because it sometimes complicates the exercise of American power in the world (issues of practical importance), complex and important questions concerning the character of this country's pluralist democracy and the rights and obligations of citizenship (issues of political ethics) can be raised.<sup>36</sup>

It should be obvious that Smith sees the actions of an ethnic interest group can create complicating problems for American policy and foreign policy especially.

Smith argues that we have gone through two separate stages of ethnic group influence and are now entering a third stage of influence. The first stage is from around 1900 until about the beginning of the Second World War. During this time, "the most active ethnic groups — German, Scandinavian, and Irish, and later Italian — acted as a drag on American involvement in world affairs."<sup>37</sup> One of the key reasons for the ability of these groups to be "a drag" on American policy was because of their large numbers of immigrants entering the United States. Smith points out that in 1910 the U.S. population, which totaled 92 million, contained at least 13.5 million who were foreign born which represents almost 15% of the total population. Further, of the 13.5 million foreign born people living in the United States, approximately 12 million were from the belligerent nation-states involved in World War I.<sup>38</sup> Clearly, if 15% of the population is actively opposed to national policies, such as involvement on the European continent, then they

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<sup>35</sup> Tony Smith. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2000. 1-2.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

will get some attention and could force changes in planned foreign policy. This could be considered to have led to bad American foreign policy.

The second stage identified by Smith is from 1945 to the end of the Cold War. During this period of time ethnic group influence rapidly changed its view. “Internationalism, not neutrality or isolationism, became the hallmark of this new stage of ethnic activism, providing a firm domestic underpinning to U.S. steadfastness in fighting Soviet communism.”<sup>39</sup> This remarkable change in policy led to a completely new role for European ethnic groups in influencing American foreign policy. Smith goes on to describe how descendants of East and West Europe helped the U.S. win the Cold War:

From Washington’s perspective, the Cold War in Europe allowed East and West European Americans to feel a solidarity with one another as well as an end to any tension they might have felt between their ethnic loyalties and their identities as Americans — the problem that had bothered Washington between the 1910’s and 1941...Indeed, activist elements among East European and Jewish Americans were influential in their different ways at upsetting effort at détente and so forcing the Cold War to a conclusion ultimately favorable to the United States.<sup>40</sup>

This statement by Smith reflects the power that ethnic interest groups can use in order to achieve their desired outcomes of American foreign policy.

Smith also describes an emerging ethnic interest group being African Americans who began to take an active interest and politically influential role in shaping American foreign policy toward Africa during this second stage as well. He argues that African Americans worked within the American political system to achieve their goals. With the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States, their influence increased

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 59.

dramatically and helped to later lead to economic sanctions against South African apartheid.<sup>41</sup>

With the end of the Cold War we have entered the third stage of ethnic group influence, according to Smith. This stage is still marked by activist support for American engagement in world affairs. Smith argues that the end of the Cold War has led to two new developments in the power of ethnic interest groups,

The end of the Cold War has given rise to two interrelated developments so far as the influence of American ethnic groups in Washington are concerned: the rise of ethnonationalist conflict abroad stemming from the collapse of Soviet power and the withdrawal of American support has alerted American kinfolk to the need for action; and the decline of any obvious threat to U.S. security has weakened the American state relative to social forces at home, which in turn has increased the openness of our political system to interest group influence.<sup>42</sup>

One of the examples that Smith uses to prove his point about increased influence is the enlargement of NATO. He describes the active involvement of Eastern and Central European Americans in the 1996 Presidential elections and that they represented significant voting blocs in several key states, which included Michigan and Ohio. Smith points out that President Clinton gave all his major NATO enlargement speeches in key cities such as Detroit and Chicago.<sup>43</sup>

Smith also discusses the fact that other new ethnic groups are beginning to make an impact on American foreign policy such as the Latin American organizations. Even with this explosion of ethnic interest group influence in this third stage, Smith points to the problems that such influence can create for the making of American foreign policy.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 65.



The Helms-Burton sanctions act, meant to help secure the end of Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, was legislation heavily promoted by the Cuban ethnic interest group community. Their efforts, which helped to secure passage of this law in 1996 and thereby created an explicit aspect of U.S. foreign policy, has led to some negative consequences for the U.S. in the international arena. One example of where it has created a problem for U.S. foreign policy, cited by Smith, is the United Nations General Assembly resolution, which passed by a vote of 143 to 3, calling on the United States to end the Helms-Burton sanctions against Cuba.<sup>44</sup> Such dramatic actions by the international community undoubtedly have a negative effect on American credibility in the conduct of international relations.

The importance in this history of Smith's is that it shows us that ethnic interest groups are not new players to the political scene, quite the opposite in fact. It also tells us that their influence has changed with changes in time, which is directly related to the three stages. While it is important to note that AAI is not that old among interest groups, it is part of a community of ethnic interest groups that have existed for a long time already and that they are merely a new ethnic community to the political scene.

Jack Walker also provides a starting point for understanding why interests mobilize in his essay, "Explaining the Mobilization of Interests," which is found in Walker's book *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. He begins his examination of mobilization with a brief look at previous views on how and why groups mobilize. This review includes works by Mancur Olson, Robert Dahl, and David Truman. While Walker recognizes the importance of these earlier contributions, he believes that previous research fails to provide the better understanding of how and why interests groups form.

Walker suggests that the reason interest groups do form is that “patrons” for these interest groups have grown large in number. These patrons are for the most part, according to Walker, “...large, complex institutions, not wealthy individuals.”<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, individuals are involved. The author presents us with a list of potential patrons and their impact on mobilizing interests groups, some of which might surprise some individuals:

Government officials, the leaders of major foundations, the largest businesses, and many other important institutions in American society are powerful forces in encouraging or discouraging the development of new groups in response to major social developments. Patrons of political action, from both the private and public sectors of the economy, alter the public opportunities for mobilization and for representation through the interest group system.<sup>46</sup>

The reason that I say the list might be surprising to some is because of the role of the government in being a potential patron for interest groups. Further, by no means do I believe that this list is a “be all and end all” list of potential patrons to interest groups, but it does provide for a framework for understanding who possible patrons might include.

Walker distinguishes between “institutional patronage and political mobilization,” and “social movements and political mobilization.” The key to understanding the difference between the two is almost as if organizations, or to be more specific business, was what consisted among institutional patronage. Business does not have to mean General Motors; it can mean a society of professionals working together for common policy objectives.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, social movements tend to be more like “political

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>45</sup> Jack L. Walker, Jr. “Explaining the Mobilization of Interests,” in *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*, by Jack L. Walker, Jr., 41-56. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000) 53.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 54-55.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 49.

“insurgencies” that involve activities like political protest and possibly even the use of boycotts.<sup>48</sup> Admittedly, the two types of groups discussed by Walker are very different from each other, but that does not mean that they cannot be working together. The author cites the civil rights work of the 1960’s as the beginning of not only increasing interest groups, but also a period in time in which complex institutions worked with the groups organizing social movements.<sup>49</sup>

The purpose of this piece is to explain why people mobilize. We learn that it is, as we might suspect, to protect and/or promote one’s interests. The difference is in understanding how they mobilize and what we discover is the importance of patrons in making mobilization a reality. While it is easy to link patrons as being available only to the wealthiest individuals or corporations who seek to merely protect their own interests, we discover that a surprisingly large number of potential patrons exist, not only for business, but to aid social movements as well.

While Walker’s view of patrons is important, it is not the only viable theory concerning how interest groups form. In his article, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” Robert Salisbury examines how political entrepreneurs are crucial in forming an interest group. This essay by Salisbury is actually about more than just political entrepreneurs, but that is the aspect I shall focus on, as it is most relevant to discussing AAI.

Salisbury begins his essay with an examination of two previous theories of interest group formation, the first is proliferation hypothesis and the second is the

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 51-52.

homeostatic mechanism hypothesis. He argues, while using the growth of agricultural interest groups as the case study, that both of these theories are not effective in providing an explanation of interest group formation.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, he sets out to lay the groundwork for a new theory of interest group formation, what he calls an exchange theory.

Salisbury readily admits that his exchange theory is based on “simple economic models.”<sup>51</sup> He cites four core terms, which must exist for his theory to function. They are: entrepreneur/organizer, benefits, group member, and exchange.<sup>52</sup> Of these four terms the most important to our discussion is the entrepreneur/organizer, which we shall also refer to as political entrepreneur. According to Salisbury the definition of a political entrepreneur shall be, “The entrepreneur in any organizational situation is the initiator of the enterprise. Behaviorally, it is always true that he must make the first move if any exchange activity is to occur.”<sup>53</sup> The exchange activity that he is referring to is the idea that the political entrepreneur has provided goods and/or services in exchange for people becoming members. Those goods and/or services are what he refers to as benefits. The reasons that an individual may become a political entrepreneur are varied. They might do it as a simple career choice or because they believe passionately in their cause and therefore their cause is why they do it. Other reasons could include the opportunity to influence the political process and become a person who wields significant power in the public policy community.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 49. While I am not exactly certain that this was the goal of the author’s, I believe it does provide an example of these two sets of groups merging to work together.

<sup>50</sup> Robert H. Salisbury. “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (Feb., 1969): 1-32. 11.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

Salisbury points to three different types of benefits a person might receive from being a member of an interest group. He uses the work of Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson to list and describe the three types of benefits: material, solidary, and purposive benefits.<sup>54</sup> The first of these benefits are referred to as material benefits, which means they are tangible benefits. The person who receives material benefits could be receiving a job or money or some other form of goods or services.<sup>55</sup>

The second type of benefit is a solidary benefit. This type of benefit only an individual can receive because it is "...experienced directly and within the self."<sup>56</sup> It is the benefit of having oneself associated with a particular group of individuals. Salisbury is careful though to regard such types of groups that provide such solidary benefits as "fringe" groups that are unlikely to be of any relevance in influencing public policy.<sup>57</sup>

The final type of benefit is the purposive benefit. This type of benefit can be defined as,

the realization of suprapersonal goals, goals of the organization or group. Although, of course, the benefits of such achievement may accrue to particular individuals they are not ordinarily divisible into units of value allocated to specific persons or charged against unit costs. Nor can purposive benefits always be confined to the parties seeking them.<sup>58</sup>

Purposive benefits are the most applicable that members of AAI can receive. One only needs to look at the mission of AAI to realize that it provides purposive benefits

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 15. From Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (Sept. , 1961): 129-166.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 16.

compared to material or solidary benefits. The mission of AAI is quite simple; it seeks to represent the Arab American community's interests in government and politics.<sup>59</sup> These types of benefits can only be purposive because having your interests represented fails to provide one with direct tangible benefits or gaining social status by being a member of the organization.

Philip Jones has also looked at the subject of political entrepreneurs and their relationship to interest groups. By looking at Jones' definition of a political entrepreneur we find several characteristics of such an individual. First, a political entrepreneur recognizes a group of individuals who share a common goal and will use this to profit themselves in some manner. This also assumes that the political entrepreneur will seek to maximize their profit.<sup>60</sup> Jones does not make clear exactly what forms of profit he is talking about. Therefore, I believe it can be a safe assumption that profit can mean a variety of different things for any political entrepreneur. It can represent financial profit or even some sort of personal profit because they feel a great deal of personal passion for their cause and are not seeking to reap a financial profit from this venture. A final characteristic is that of a "go-between." This is where the political entrepreneur establishes himself or herself as the person who provides the goods desired by the membership in exchange for their support.<sup>61</sup>

Another important aspect of understanding interest groups is in understanding how they employ that influence to affect public policy. Thomas Gais and Jack Walker explore how interest groups exercise their influence in their essay, "Pathways to

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<sup>59</sup> Arab American Institute, "Mission." Available from <http://www.aaiusa.org>; (Accessed July 19, 2002.) Internet.

<sup>60</sup> Philip Jones. The Appeal of the Political Entrepreneur," *British Journal of Political Science*, (Oct., 1978): 498-504. 499.

Influence in American Politics,” from Walker’s book *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. This chapter specifically examines the choice between “inside” and “outside” strategies made by interest groups and which strategy is more likely to be implemented by each type of group.

An “inside” strategy can be defined as activities “to convince public officials to take some form of action or to modify an established policy by means of close consultation with political and administrative leaders.” This form of activity can use financial resources and substantive expertise on the policy in order to achieve the interest group’s desired results.<sup>62</sup> While an inside strategy may operate on the basis of direct lobbying, the opposite is true for an “outside” strategy. An outside strategy is “an indirect effort to exert influence upon the outcome of a specific policy decision.”<sup>63</sup> Further, an outside strategy may be a supplemental effort to the efforts of an inside strategy, in which the interest group uses its membership as a political tool.<sup>64</sup> Some examples of what constitutes an outside strategy could include getting the interest group’s membership to make contacts with their Member of Congress, protests, and demonstrations.

Multiple factors must be weighed before an interest group decides which of the two strategies will be the foundation for all future endeavors. The authors find that the most critical factor to influence their decision will be defined by the amount of conflict that exists within their area of concern. Following the level of conflict, other variables involved include organizational resources, its membership, and financial support.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 499-500.

<sup>62</sup> Thomas L. Gais and Jack L. Walker, Jr. “Pathways to Influence in American Politics,” in *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*, by Jack L. Walker, Jr. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000) 103.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 104-105.

Gais and Walker operationalize organizational resources as the size of the staff that an interest group has available to it. The size of the staff dictates what political tactics are available to it. A small staff is restricted to taking on fewer activities because it does not have the capacity to effectively execute its strategy if it attempts to overreach its staff's resources. On the other hand, a large staff can allow an interest group to increase their capacity for multiple tasks or multiple strategies in order to gain or wield influence.<sup>66</sup>

The next determining factor is the "character of a group's membership." The membership of any interest group is what really decides what the goals of the group will be. Since the membership decides the goals of any group it is the responsibility of the group's administration to accomplish those goals:

The survival of the organization is assured only so long as it is able to maintain the approval of its members, so its leaders normally must direct all efforts to advancing those values and policies that are of direct concern to the membership.<sup>67</sup>

The character of a membership must always be taken into consideration when examining an organization or even when leading one. Without an understanding of its character the leadership will fail to properly understand the goals of the membership and thereby most likely fail to achieve their desired aims.

One other major factor in determining what political strategy to pursue is concerned with financial resources. Gais and Walker are not referring to budgets when they discuss the financial resources; no doubt that budgets help to determine strategy, but they examine it from the perspective of *who* gives the group their monetary support:

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



Most groups rely upon several different sources of funding and are not entirely beholden to any single patron, but group leaders cannot ignore the political goals or preferences of their patrons any more than the needs of their dues-paying members.<sup>68</sup>

Clearly, this points out that while the character of a group's membership may be important in determining goals, it is by no means exclusive in its influence on the administration of an interest group. The administration of any group needs its patrons' continual support in order to fund its activities; in a sense the administration has two separate "bosses" to keep happy. It must maintain the support of both its membership and its patrons at the same time, even if that might mean conflict between the two sources of support.

Gais and Walker readily point out that by examining the given factors on what influences a group's political strategy, we discover that the different types of groups that Walker discussed in an earlier piece, take different strategies. For example, profit occupational interest groups tend to prefer inside strategies because they only take on issues of primary concern to them which decreases potential conflict, they tend to rely more on their membership dues rather than patrons, and finally they tend to have larger organizational resources. All of these factors suggest that this type of group prefers an inside strategy.<sup>69</sup>

While an examination of the strategies chosen by the different typologies of the interest groups could be useful, it is more important to examine the specifics of citizen groups as we have already narrowed AAI into that category of interest groups. Based upon the variables discussed earlier and the inclusion of what Gais and Walker refer to as

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 106

subunits (a dummy variable), but are effectively local or regional chapters of an interest group, they develop a model to run a multivariate analysis to determine if these factors do indeed influence the choice an interest group makes on which political strategy it will adopt.

The results for citizen groups are relatively clear: they tend to use outside strategies as a dominant form of political strategy. Using the authors' regression of outside strategies, they discover that conflict and subunits are very important factors used by citizen groups to decide that the outside strategy is their preferred method.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, when inside strategy is regressed, we find that citizen groups again use conflict as important factor, but also staff size in determining whether or not to use an inside strategy. Gais and Walker best summarize their findings as follows:

To summarize, the groups most likely to adopt inside strategies are those in the profit sector that maintain large staffs and perceive high levels of conflict in their environment, while the groups least likely to follow the inside pathway to influence are those citizen groups with few organizational resources that experience little or no conflict with other groups and do not feel that they are affected by the outcome of national elections.<sup>71</sup>

Based on the evidence that we see from Gais and Walker we can assume that most citizen groups will likely adopt an outside strategy in order to achieve their desired political goals.

Tony Smith, who provided us with a history of ethnic interest groups earlier, also examines how ethnic interest groups exercise influence in Washington, DC. In order to understand how that influence is achieved, Smith looks at two important topics, the

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 105-107, 118. Some of this evidence is based upon a regression analysis used by Gais and Walker concerning inside strategies. See Table 6-6 on page 118.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 117. See Table 6-5.

structure of American politics and how the ethnic groups are organized. Smith views state-society relations as being an integral if not the most integral aspect of how American politics is structured.<sup>72</sup> Essentially, Smith is arguing that with the current structure of American democracy, the political process and institutions, such as the Congress, are easily accessible to an interest group. This accessibility has allowed interest groups, more specifically ethnic interest groups, an opportunity to help shape policy, especially foreign policy.<sup>73</sup>

According to Smith, the result of his review of the American political structure lends itself to four basic propositions. The first is that ethnic interest groups need to be studied separately from other forms of interest groups. Secondly, because of the nature of the American political system, it requires very little political capital to start an interest group, including ethnic interest groups. Third, even though some ethnic groups are political party affiliated, there are still some conditions in which ethnic group influence is likely to be greater.<sup>74</sup> Finally, interest groups at times may wield enough influence to actually determine national policy, but whether or not it may represent the best for the nation is in question.<sup>75</sup> With an understanding of how Smith views the American political structure we can now proceed to his discussion on how ethnic interest groups exercise their influence.

Smith finds that there are three basic methods used by ethnic interest groups to wield influence over public officials. These are: the ethnic community's vote, campaign

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>72</sup> Smith, 87.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 88-94.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 93. These conditions are: when it appeals to both political parties, when the Congress and the president are from different political parties, when the country is in a crisis that weakens the state as a whole, or when the country is at peace with no threats to its vital interests, making bipartisanship difficult to establish.

finance contributions, and by an organizational body, which is in reference to the structure of the interest group itself.<sup>76</sup> Smith suggests that just because ethnic communities may lack size in terms of pure numbers, that doesn't mean that they aren't hugely important in the electoral process. He cites that the Jewish, Greek, Cuban, and Armenian communities as comprising very small percentages of the total population, yet they are politically powerful as ethnic groups.<sup>77</sup>

While ethnic groups are small in population percentage and may have some effect on national elections, Smith points out that their real influence can be found in Congressional elections:

Ethnic voters do not have to make a decisive difference in national elections for their voice to be heard in Washington. It may be enough for ethnic lobbies to achieve their goals to be represented by well-placed members of Congress, preferably by senior senators or representatives in charge of committees whose duties give them a role in determining matters of significance to the ethnic community.<sup>78</sup>

One example that he uses to cite the importance of an ethnic group voting in such elections is the Jewish community of New York. Smith points out that they constitute a significant portion of the state's Democratic party and tend to vote in above average numbers helping to ensure that their voice is heard in foreign policy before Congressional committees. As he points out, the manner in which we elect people to Congress creates an opportunity for ethnic interest groups to apply pressure to the candidates because their

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 93-94.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 98.

support could be crucial in deciding some elections, thereby giving influence to the group.<sup>79</sup>

Campaign financing is the second method that Smith cites concerning how ethnic interest groups gain influence. He readily admits that ethnic interest groups give large amounts of money to candidates for public office and for some very small ethnic communities this a method to make up for their lack of voting power.<sup>80</sup> Yet, there is a possible problem with the ethnic interest group money, which is that it might be illegally raised.<sup>81</sup> He cites several examples of illegal campaign contributions, including the large donations made by the Asian American community to the Democratic party for the 1996 presidential election.<sup>82</sup>

In his review of campaign financing, Smith declares it almost impossible to track ethnic contributions. "In my investigations into ethnic group financing of various campaigns, I found it was often impossible to establish who contributed what or why."<sup>83</sup> Yet, we know ethnic interest groups do give money and lots of it to gain access. One example of this is the amount of money donated by the Jewish community. Smith points out that they might very well donate half or more of all Democratic party funds for national elections.<sup>84</sup> This large number of donors might seem high, but when put in the context of Jewish PAC's such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), Jewish-owned companies, and Jewish individuals all making donations, it seems to be a much more reasonable number.

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>81</sup> According to the Federal Elections Commission, it is illegal to receive campaign contributions from foreign nationals or individuals under contract to the Federal government.

<sup>82</sup> Smith, 102-103.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 107.

Further, while not all Jewish donors might have the same political agenda as AIPAC, it is very easy for AIPAC to take advantage of these other individual donations to gain further leverage. This is because if the individuals don't make their political views well known, the candidates who received that money are not going to know the difference and can easily associate those donations with those given by Jewish PAC's. This could very well be one of the reasons that the Arab American community does not share the same level of influence as the Jewish American community, they simply are not providing the same levels of campaign contributions as is the Jewish community. I will explore this further later in my study.

The final aspect of acquiring and exercising influence according to Smith is what he calls organizational leadership. This can be broken down further into three separate categories: organizational unity, coalition building and agenda setting, and monitoring policy. All of these aspects must be employed by an ethnic interest group to achieve success. Smith uses the AIPAC as the model for all successful ethnic interest groups.<sup>85</sup>

Organizational unity involves the interest group being united in its efforts, at least in public, in order to show strength and prevent the appearance of weakness within the organization. This can be done at first by its organization being formed with a strong leader who makes the organization into a force in politics. This could be the role of a patron from Gais and Walker or a political entrepreneur from Salisbury. Nevertheless, while the first leader of the organization may be important, Smith argues that they are potentially dangerous later if the interest group does not become more

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 109-110.

“institutionalized.”<sup>86</sup> Therefore, it is important to have a strongly rooted base so that the organizational unity may be maintained.

Next for Smith is coalition building and agenda setting. This activity involves the interest group seeking allies outside of their own ethnic community. “A political agenda must be established, allies sought, and actual political pressure brought to bear — all matters that involve action outside the ethnic community itself.”<sup>87</sup> There are three common types of demands sought out by ethnic interest groups: 1) human rights, 2) economic demands, such as foreign aid, and 3) security demands.<sup>88</sup> In order to gain any effectiveness in pressing their demands the ethnic group must go outside their community. Using AIPAC as an example, they work closely with conservative Christian groups to access political leverage.<sup>89</sup> Smith points out that a common ally for Arab Americans is the African American community.<sup>90</sup> The goal of working with other interest groups outside your ethnic community is to increase the political pressures brought to bear on a public policy and hopefully thereby increasing your influence.

The third and final category is that of monitoring policy. This is related to “inside lobbying.” It is using lobbyists to meet with members of Congress and/or their staffers in order to make your influence more directly felt. Smith admits that the most powerful figure in foreign policy decision-making is the president, but Congress is far more accessible to lobbyists:

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>88</sup> Smith’s book might give the appearance that ethnic interest groups are only interested in foreign policy. I don’t believe that Smith seeks to give that impression, but simply his work is concerned with ethnic interest groups and foreign policy and this certainly true of AIPAC. The work of AIPAC is foreign policy driven. During the course of my interview with AAI, I learned they are more concerned with domestic policy than with foreign policy.

<sup>89</sup> Smith, 118-120.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 119.

Hence, while not for a moment forgetting the paramount importance of the White House, ethnic lobbies invariably focus most of their energy on the Congress, especially on the House, while their members at the grassroots anxiously await primaries.<sup>91</sup>

Clearly, successfully getting your voice heard as an ethnic interest group is to place your efforts into establishing connections with members of Congress, because establishing a network at the White House is so much more difficult to accomplish and could end up wasting precious resources if you fail.

Thus, I assert that while both the other categories of organizational resources are important, this is by far the most critical to an effective ethnic lobbying effort. This is the type of effort where members of Congress and their staffers know who your lobbyists are and can even seek them out. The ability to monitor policy and to know who your friends and enemies are in Congress is to have the ability to shape public policy because you know what strategies to employ and where to place your resources in order to be most effective.<sup>92</sup>

Smith's book provides us with an excellent history of ethnic interest groups. It has helped me to realize that these are not something new to American politics, but in fact are rather old to the political scene generally speaking. Further, it has given us another manner to examine how influence is gained in Washington, DC. We can find some common ground between Smith's work and Gais and Walker's examination of influence.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>92</sup> Smith's focus on inside strategies is intentional. I don't believe that Smith would dismiss outside strategies as irrelevant, but he merely focuses his work on examining the inside strategies of ethnic interest



Especially with reference to inside strategies, Smith expounded on the concepts presented by Gais and Walker, by making them more understandable for foreign and defense policy interest groups. I can now use the ideas presented by both Smith and Gais and Walker to create my own model for examining how the Arab American community asserts influence through AAI.

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groups. I also would not dismiss the importance of an outside strategy, but rather suggest that the most effective outside strategy has an effective inside strategy working parallel to it.

## RESEARCH QUESTION

In order to understand the direction that this study is taking we must ask ourselves some questions that can give us the necessary guidance to pursue this topic. Does the Arab American community have influence over Congressional policymaking? That is the central question that is being asked. Yet, to answer that question, direction is still necessary.

Therefore, to explore the central question, I will establish a model with which to answer it. I have chosen to use AAI as the case study for examining Arab American influence because they are touted as a leader among the Arab American community. As seen in Figure 1 (see Appendix A), three key variables must be established in order to answer the central question. All of the factors are independent variables. The dependent variable is influence. The first independent variable is voting turnout among the Arab American community. Secondly, are organizational resources. In essence this is an examination of an insider strategy by AAI. The final variable examines political action committee (PAC) contributions to members of Congress. I will use two separate roll call votes from the House of Representatives to determine if PAC contributions make a difference in terms of establishing influence.

## CASE STUDY OF AAI

With the model in place, which consists of the Arab American community's voting turnout, organizational resources, and PAC contributions, it becomes easier to examine their level of influence in Congressional decision-making. Unfortunately, while this model does contain three distinct variables I will only be measuring two of them. The voting turnout variable will not be measured in this study because it is beyond the scope of this project. I by no means want to devalue the importance of this variable and encourage future scholars to examine this aspect of the model in greater detail in the future.

Reasons that voting is important to this model are varied and should be considered by future scholars of this topic.<sup>93</sup> If the study was to include voting and focus on district-by-district races of the House, one could see where the strongest voting centers of the Arab American community are located. By cross referencing those districts against U.S. Census data it would be possible to determine if the community is voting as a bloc or not. This could translate into determining if they are influencing House races and how the candidates and especially the eventual winner relate to the Arab American community. Further, they could examine those representatives' roll call voting records to determine if they are influenced by possible election rewards or consequences by their district voters.

One other excellent reason to include voting in future models is to determine if political party affiliation is having an influence on Congress. If the Arab American

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<sup>93</sup> See Robert S. Erickson. "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting," *American Political Science Review*, (Dec., 1971): 1018-1032.

community is equally divided in political affiliation between Republican and Democratic, this division could have a negative impact because it does not present the appearance of a united ethnic community. The agendas of the political parties differ on how to handle the issues of importance to the community and therefore should be taken into account with future models.<sup>94</sup>

Before examining the model any further, let us begin with a discussion of how AAI fits into being an interest group based upon the literature that has been previously examined. There are several different Arab American interest groups that could be studied and undoubtedly deserve the time and attention of scholars. One example of a very important group is the National Association of Arab Americans-American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (NAAA-ADC). This group is the product of a merger between the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), a foreign policy group, and the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), a civil rights organization. The NAAA-ADC is now the government affairs arm of the ADC.<sup>95</sup> Clearly, this has the markings of a group that could be studied in this paper, but their political action committee was formed in 2001 and thus is too new to be included.<sup>96</sup> A second interest group I could have studied is the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce. This organization is devoted to strengthening business relationships between the US and the

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<sup>94</sup> Let me also point out an important consideration for future models to take into account. They must be careful to separate between the Arab American *ethnic* community and the Muslim American *religious* community, which includes some Arab Americans. These are two very different communities and may not have completely compatible political agendas.

<sup>95</sup> National Association of Arab Americans-Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, "About NAAA-ADC." Available from <http://www.naaa-adc.org>; (Accessed October 23, 2002.) Internet.

<sup>96</sup> National Association of Arab Americans-Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, "NAAA-ADC PAC." Available from <http://www.naaa-adc.org>; (Accessed October 15, 2002.) Internet.

Arab world.<sup>97</sup> While this group certainly has political concerns it is clearly directed towards just business concerns, while AAI takes on a far more broad range of issues.

Walker's identification and discussion of citizen groups has allowed us to place AAI into that grouping of interests. This is because AAI is an open-membership based group that is not based on occupational or government interests. AAI is interested in influencing policy that involves Arab-Americans. While they may take on numerous issues ranging from civil rights and immigration to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, they still care about those issues important to the Arab-American community and work to advance the interests of that community.

Tierney's work is most useful to this paper when it is placed into context with the typologies of groups that Walker earlier provided. While Walker provides us with the definition of citizen groups, Tierney allows us to narrow down a more specific definition of what type of interest group AAI represents because of his definition of what constitutes ethnic interest groups. Using Walker's definition of citizen groups, we can now place AAI as a citizen group and narrow it down even further by using Tierney's definition of ethnic interest groups. Tierney's definition encompasses religious and cultural sub-groupings and I'm focusing on the cultural aspects of his definition over his inclusion of religion.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, we can refer to AAI as an ethnic citizen group by combining Walker and Tierney's typologies. This is important in understanding how we define AAI and in understanding its general goals, to promote the views of its members, which happen to constitute an ethnic makeup.

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<sup>97</sup> National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, "Mission." Available from <http://www.nusacc.org>; (Accessed October 15, 2002.) Internet.

<sup>98</sup> Tierney, 93.

Using the work of Salisbury as a foundation of understanding we can consider AAI to be an organization built upon the work of a political entrepreneur compared to a patron because of its leader, Dr. James Zogby. We can determine that Dr. Zogby is a political entrepreneur by examining his biography. This points out that he founded AAI in 1985 and that he and AAI have worked to gain political empowerment for Arab Americans in a variety of ways.<sup>99</sup> One can continue to read his biography and will quickly realize what a major political player that Dr. Zogby has become.

As early as the late 1970's, Dr. Zogby was making an impact when he co-founded the Palestine Human Rights Campaign. In 1982, he co-founded Save Lebanon, Inc., which seeks to provide humanitarian aid in Lebanon. Dr. Zogby's political influence began to become more apparent in 1993 when Vice-President Al Gore asked him to lead an organization called Builders for Peace, whose goal was to promote American businesses investing in the West Bank and Gaza. Not only has he worked with the Clinton Administration, but also he was appointed in January of 2001 by President George W. Bush to serve as a member of the Central-Asian-American Enterprise Fund.<sup>100</sup> Dr. Zogby's political resume is much more extensive than I have outlined here, but this does serve to show that he is clearly a political entrepreneur. Based upon this information and the work of Salisbury, we can accept that AAI represents an interest group formed on the basis of political entrepreneurship compared to Walker's idea of patronage.

When examining the strategies that AAI chooses to employ we discover a great deal about their effectiveness and the problems that they face. For example, AAI faces strong conflict in their policy areas of concern. Further, they have no significant subunits

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<sup>99</sup> Arab American Institute, "Dr. James Zogby: Biography." Available from <http://www.aaiusa.org>; (Accessed July 19, 2002.) Internet.

in which to organize an effective outside or grassroots campaign.<sup>101</sup> We can also assume that AAI does not have the organizational resources of their competing interests groups, which put them at a significant disadvantage to conduct an effective inside strategy. AAI relies heavily on membership dues. Based on data that will be shown later, AAI takes an inside strategy and uses an outside strategy to assist their inside efforts. This would be similar to what Gais and Walker describe early on of interest groups who might use an outside strategy to merely supplement their inside strategy.<sup>102</sup>

One other item to keep in mind is the ethnic community as a voting bloc. Smith has shown us the importance of the ethnic group vote as a key to influence. We can look at the location of the Arab-American community in this regard to determine their voting powers. While the Arab-American community may also exist in other states, their real demographic concentration is their location in Michigan, which unlike the Jewish community from New York doesn't automatically grant them a seat at the table for foreign policy discussions. Yet, they do have large populations in the Congressional districts in and around the Detroit metropolitan area, which does show the potential for influence on a variety of issues.

Now with this understanding of how AAI fits into being an interest group and the strategies it employs I can begin this case study with an examination of organizational resources as shown in the model. An inside strategy was also discussed earlier and it is understood to be applying direct communication with members of Congress through the

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> I discovered in a telephone conversation with AAI on July 12, 2002 that they maintain no regional or local chapters of their organization. They do maintain two operations offices outside of Washington, DC though, one in Michigan and the other in New Jersey.

<sup>102</sup> Thomas L. Gais and Jack L. Walker, Jr. "Pathways to Influence in American Politics," in *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*, by Jack L. Walker, Jr. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000) 103.

use of lobbyists. In this model any reference to organizational resources must be understood in the broader context of what it really represents. Organizational resources encompass a variety of things including staff size, which directly relates to staff activity. A larger staff presents an interest group with the opportunity to accomplish more things and make their message heard by more people in public policy, be it the Congress or within the executive branch. Further, organizational resources can include the leadership of an interest group. An interest group with a strong and charismatic leader can find greater success at having their message heard than those organizations that lack such leadership.

The means by which I have studied the effectiveness of AAI's organizational resources or its inside strategy is through a series of interviews I conducted in Washington, DC in early March of 2002 with the foreign policy staffers to four different members of Congress.<sup>103</sup> Pursuant to my agreement with these individuals, all of their names and the names of the Representatives for whom they work are confidential.<sup>104</sup> Therefore I will employ a discreet means of identification to facilitate the study of this paper. Representative A is from the Northeast. Representative B is from the Southwest. Representatives C and D are from the Great Lakes Region. Of the four members, two are Republican and two are Democrats. Three of the four members also serve on the House

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<sup>103</sup> I will readily admit that this is a very small number of offices in which to conduct interviews for research purposes when there are 435 members of the U.S. House. I would simply remind individuals that in the post-Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> and post-anthrax environment of Washington, D.C. I considered myself fortunate to manage getting these four interviews. I contacted approximately forty different Congressional offices via mail, email, fax, and finally by telephone attempting to gain an interview. I also used my personal connections to gain a couple of the interviews I was able to get. I would like to thank all of those individuals who granted me an interview.

<sup>104</sup> I will use the word "he" as a pronoun for all of the Representatives, even though it should be considered gender neutral. It is being done merely to aid in the flow of the paper, while maintaining the confidentiality of my interview subjects.



International Relations committee. Representative C is the only member who does not serve on the House International Relations committee.

I also interviewed Mr. Majed Jafari, Director of Government Relations for AAI. Two of the key goals of my interview with Mr. Jafari were to evaluate the political strength of AAI and its effectiveness as perceived by the organization itself. In order to achieve these goals I asked a variety of questions concerning the political growth of the organization and its policy goals. The answers to many of those questions will give us better insight into the political goals of AAI and how it seeks to achieve those goals.

Let me begin by discussing membership. According to Mr. Jafari, AAI has approximately 12,000 individuals that make up its membership. This is a sizable membership and could be used to make a political impact. Further, that membership has increased since the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Also that membership is based in key geographic centers of the country. The largest concentration is in Dearborn, MI, but other areas include Chicago, Cleveland, and the New York/New Jersey area. All of these are large cities or regions and are politically important in election years. This could suggest a potential political impact and a voting study could help to confirm this. Further, AAI has become the de facto leader of Arab American interest groups with Dr. Zogby being an ever more important political player who is increasingly sought out by members of Congress for his advice and expertise.

During a discussion on AAI strategies and policy goals, I was able to learn a great deal about how AAI tries to get its message out to policymakers. Two of these strategies include getting prominent members of AAI to write op-ed's to significant newspapers that could be seen by the policymaking community. Secondly and perhaps more

important is their efforts to get more Congressional offices to meet with them. Following the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, Mr. Jafari asserted that more policymakers are willing to take calls from AAI even though their strategy had not changed significantly from before the attacks. He viewed this increase in access as such, "What we have to say, is a bit more important to people." Clearly he is suggesting that the attacks may have awakened policymakers to the Arab American community and their unique expertise on issues of importance to the Middle East. Further, we should remember that expertise is considered vital to an inside strategy because many policymakers, especially members of Congress and their staffers, cannot be experts on every issue and so they turn to interest groups for that information.

Two other means of AAI asserting influence can be seen in different ways. The first, according to Mr. Jafari, is getting individuals involved in the political process. This means getting Arab Americans to vote, write their Congressperson or Senator, and generally be politically active. This is clearly a means of an outside strategy that I am not measuring, but wanted to point out. The other strategy is actually getting Arab Americans elected to public office. This has both the feel of an outside strategy and an inside strategy. It is an inside strategy because it automatically would provide AAI with allies in public office which can be an important base for any successful inside strategies. While both of these strategies are difficult to measure in terms of actually gaining influence, it is important to know that they exist and are actively being implemented.

When we discussed specific policy goals of AAI, I differentiated between domestic and foreign policy goals. I was surprised to learn that domestic policy is a greater concern to AAI rather than foreign policy. I think many people would assume that

the Middle East would be the organization's primary goal, but that is not so.

Nevertheless, foreign policy has been forced to become a primary goal, so says Mr. Jafari, because of the conflict being experienced in the Middle East. Since they are the leading Arab American interest group in the United States, they are forced to play a more prominent role on this issue than perhaps they would like.

Yet, they do have a foreign policy agenda beyond just ending the violence in Israel and the occupied territories. Two important foreign policy goals of AAI are economic aid to both the occupied territories and Lebanon. They also are working towards democratization in Jordan. They also oppose the current regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but to want provide for a moderating voice that wants diplomacy and not military conflict as leading to regime change in Iraq.

The domestic agenda of AAI has two very important items that top their list of policy goals. The first concern is airline profiling. Their argument is that profiling does not work and only leads to an abuse of civil rights. Yet, if profiling is to take place they want a role in the training and education of individuals who would be carrying out such activities. Second, is immigration policy. AAI argues that there are at least three separate concerns related to immigration. The first is to reform the INS. Mr. Jafari referred to them as "...one of the most messed up agencies and maybe most neglected." Second, is to urge caution in tracking down expired visas. Finally, is a concern over using databases to keep track of immigrants because it could lead to violations of privacy.

The goals of AAI are quite simple. They want to increase their voice on Capitol Hill. They want to accomplish this by becoming a more visible presence on the Hill itself, but also by taking advantage of the media to make their message heard. By doing this

they hope to accomplish the goals set forward in their foreign policy and domestic agendas. Since they view themselves as the preeminent voice of the Arab American community in Washington, D.C., they see it as their responsibility to make their message heard to a wider audience and therefore setting themselves more in the center of the public policy debate on several issues of importance to the Arab American community.

During my interviews with the Congressional staffers I found several common themes and yet, some very different approaches to Congressional involvement in foreign policy. Rep. A is a member of House International Relations committee and very active in Congress with regard to foreign policy. The representative has met with several world leaders and advocates for a U.S. foreign policy that is deeply involved in the Middle East, while taking an unabashedly pro-Israel stance on numerous issues. Rep. B is also on the House International Relations committee. He takes a very strong stand on keeping the U.S. out of the Middle East and would oppose the U.S. being involved in most international activities unless it directly affects American national security. The representative supports U.S. neutrality in the Middle East.

While Reps. A and B have staked have very strong positions on U.S. foreign policy, Rep. C has done the opposite. Representative C, who is not a member of the House International Relations committee, tends to lean in favor of Israel, but prefers to defer to the executive branch on matters of foreign policy. Rep. D, also a member of the House International Relations committee, views the topic of the Middle East with a great deal of neutrality. This is not to say he is an isolationist, but views both the Arab and Jewish community as having legitimate arguments and is supportive a peace process in

which all parties are involved. This effectively keeps the representative from taking a position on either extreme of the issue.

One of the questions I asked each of the staffers concerned Arab American groups' lobbying efforts. This question was not aimed at AAI specifically, but their name was often discussed. I found the answers to be generally the same with minor differences. All of the staffers agreed that the Arab American community was generally ineffective in their lobbying efforts. The legislative assistant to Rep. D described their efforts as "inferior" compared to Jewish interest groups and Rep. A's foreign policy assistant also described Arab American efforts as being almost non-existent and unprofessional. During my discussion concerning Arab American lobbying efforts I found that several of the representatives receive more direct contact from Arab embassies than they do Arab American interest groups.

The aides to Representative's B and C both stated that the majority of the contact they receive from Arab American interest groups comes in the form of regular fax transmissions. Both of these aides stated that they get very few telephone calls from Arab American interest groups. The aide for Rep. C suggested that the best chance they might get for a telephone call was only on issues of tremendous importance to Arab American interest groups.

Compared to Arab American groups, all of the legislative aides agreed that Jewish interest groups are significantly more effective at lobbying than their Arab counterparts. The aide to Rep. C even stated that they had regular personal meetings with the staff of Jewish interest groups as well as regular phone calls. The aide for Rep. D pointed out that Jewish interest groups are always very visible and vocal. Further, they host regular events

that are attended by the members of Congress and their staffers so that the Jewish interest groups are consistently in front of the policy makers making their views prominently heard. Also, the aide to Rep. D pointed out an important difference between the two sides. He said that Jewish interest groups are very helpful in regularly responding to requests for information and often volunteer it before even being asked, compared to Arab American interest groups who do not regularly respond to or volunteer information to the member's office.

I also asked if the lobbying efforts of the Arab American interest groups had changed since the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the general answer was no. One of the aides noticed what may be called a brief period of increased activity, but that had since fallen off and another said there was only a "perception" of increased mail. The aide to Rep. D did point out that their office was experiencing a significant increase in Arab embassy activity since Sept. 11<sup>th</sup>. Further, I asked if the level of influence of the Arab American community had changed in any way since Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> and the general answer was either no it had not or that it was difficult to judge.

We can conclude from these interviews that AAI is not viewed as an effective lobbying organization on Capitol Hill. Yet, we must recognize the very different perceptions about AAI from the different staffers. For example, Rep. A already takes an ardent pro-Israeli position and could be deemed by AAI as someone that they don't want to lobby because it would be a waste of resources to them. On the other hand, they might very well lobby Rep. B because he takes a much more neutral stand on the conflict in the Middle East and could be considered approachable on some issues of concern to AAI. Rep. C., while not on the House International Relations committee, could also be

influenced because he comes from a state with a significant number of Arab Americans living in it and so politically it could be in their best interest to at least listen to AAI. Unfortunately, even though we can clearly see that the different representatives all have different perceptions of AAI, we still find a common theme, which is that AAI is ineffective at putting forth its message on Capitol Hill.

The next step for determining influence is to look at AAI's campaign contributions to candidates running for public office. Formally, AAI is not the name listed as the PAC. The PAC used for this study is the Arab American Leadership Council Political Action Committee (ALCPAC). ALCPAC is closely linked to AAI in several ways. First, Dr. Zogby is a member of ALCPAC governing board. ALCPAC also shares office space and even office staff with AAI, according to Federal Elections Commission (FEC) reports. Finally, ALCPAC is directly linked to the AAI website for requesting donations. Based on this information we can assume that a reference to ALCPAC is equivalent to AAI and that they also share the same policy positions.

A well-known general assumption of politics is that money buys influence or at least access to policy makers. Many political scientists disagree with this point of view, though, including John Wright. He effectively dismantles this assumption in a study linking contributions from pro-tobacco PAC's and two Senate roll call votes on stricter tobacco policy. By doing this, Wright argues that we cannot create strong linkages between campaign contributions and how a member of Congress will vote on policy.<sup>105</sup> Even if money does not determine votes a variety of other factors could. This could include what the constituency wants, the legislator's staff could convince him using

expert opinions, and keeping the party line could all influence how an individual legislator casts their vote.

Even with critics like Wright, it is still possible to use PAC contributions as a measure of influence. By no means am I suggesting that a PAC contribution automatically guarantees an interest group support on every issue a member of Congress will face that pertains to them. Instead, the contribution might at least give an interest group the opportunity to meet with a member of Congress or their staff and allow them the chance to make a case for their position on the policies that they are concerned with.

The manner in which the influence of PAC contributions is measured is by examining two key roll call votes in the House in the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress. Using FEC data from the 1999-2000 and the current 2001-2002 election cycles, I discovered forty-four members of the House who received contributions from ALCPAC and still served in the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress.<sup>106</sup> Of the forty-four members, 34 are Democrats, 9 are Republicans, and one Independent. AAI strategy for giving contributions is relatively simple. According to Mr. Jafari, contributions are given to any Arab American running for office regardless of political party and they are also given to those members who are considered friends of the Arab American community.

The two roll call votes chosen were the only two roll call votes listed by AAI in their 2002 Congressional Scorecard, which is why they were selected for my model.<sup>107</sup> Their scorecard is an evaluation of how each member of Congress feels on a variety of

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<sup>105</sup> John R. Wright. "Tobacco Industry PACs and the Nation's Health: A Second Opinion," in *The Interest Group Connection*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, et. al. (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997), 174-195.

<sup>106</sup> I use data from the 2001-2002 election cycle, up to the July 2002 quarterly report. See Appendix B for a complete list of recipients.

<sup>107</sup> Arab American Institute, "2002 Congressional Scorecard." Available from <http://www.aaiusa.org>; (Accessed August 1, 2002.) Internet.



issues of deemed by AAI to be of importance to the Arab American community. They are listed in this study in chronological order and not in order of importance to AAI. The first roll call vote is the USA PATRIOT Act (see appendix B, table 1), which was passed on Oct. 24<sup>th</sup>, 2001.<sup>108</sup> According to AAI's scorecard, this legislation grants the government many new powers to investigate and detain individuals, which could lead to serious civil rights violations. A second complaint is that this bill grants "the U.S. Secretary of State the power to designate any foreign or domestic group as a terrorist organization" without it being subject to review.<sup>109</sup> The second roll call vote is actually House Resolution 392 (see appendix B, table 2), which is meant to show support for Israel in its fight against terrorism, passed on May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2002. AAI opposed this resolution because it failed to mention the ever-worsening Palestinian humanitarian crisis.<sup>110</sup> In examining these two roll call votes, I separated out the vote tallies and also separated between those members of Congress who received campaign contributions from ALCPAC and those who did not.

The results from the two roll call votes and the PAC contribution connection provides for some interesting results. In appendix B, table 1, the PATRIOT ACT vote, we find that a little over half of those who received a campaign contribution voted in a manner favorable to AAI's position, while anyone who did not receive a campaign contribution was far less likely to vote against the bill. A member of Congress was far more likely to vote in favor of this legislation if they did not receive a contribution from ALCPAC. Several reasons could exist for why the 45% of those who received a contribution but still voted in favor of the legislation. These reasons could include toeing

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid. The USA PATRIOT Act is also known as Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

the party line and that it would be politically unreasonable for them to oppose it because of their constituency.

Concerning the party breakdown on the roll call votes, Republicans who received campaign contributions from ALCPAC were far more likely to vote against AAI's position than Democrats. Republicans only voted with AAI three times between the two roll calls. On the PATRIOT ACT, Democrats who received campaign contributions from ALCPAC voted 21 to 12 in favor of AAI's position.<sup>111</sup> One could argue that the party line is what caused people to vote either for or against AAI's position and not the PAC contribution. That is a legitimate point, but an individual could also be getting rewarded with a PAC contribution for voting with AAI. Furthermore, if one looks at the AAI 2002 Congressional Scorecard, they learn that even those members who voted against them on these roll call votes often did other things that earned them AAI's support, such as sponsor other legislation or sign a letter that supported a position of AAI's.

The results of the "Solidarity with Israel" resolution (see appendix B, table 2) also find that a member was far more likely to vote in a manner favorable to AAI's position if they had received a campaign contribution from ALCPAC than if they had not. AAI was able to muster thirteen "No" votes from members it had given contributions to, while only eight who had not received a contribution directly voted against the bill. Yet, AAI also viewed a vote of "Present" as favorable to their policy position and was able to get 20% of those it had given money to too vote in this manner. A surprising twenty members (or 5%) of those who did not receive ALCPAC money also voted "Present." This high number is surprising because those who did not receive money were much more likely to vote in favor of this resolution rather than against it and such a significant

number of “Present” votes could be viewed as a very minor victory for AAI because it got a small number of members of Congress to not endorse the way Israel is fighting its war on terrorism. Again, some of the same reasons mentioned earlier could exist for those members who received campaign support yet voted against AAI’s position.

The results of this examination of roll call votes and PAC contributions show us that AAI does have some influence with members of Congress, especially those it provides campaign contributions to. We should not be surprised that not every member who received a contribution from ALCPAC voted for AAI’s positions. Any number of reasons might explain their vote. Further, we should not also blindly accept the idea that a campaign contribution was the sole reason why a member of Congress votes in a manner favorable to AAI’s position. Any number of factors could exist other than a campaign contribution that would explain their vote. Nevertheless, we should be accepting that this information does present us with the fact that AAI has some influence with some members of Congress. It does not mean that they carry overwhelming influence, because campaign contributions to only forty-four members of Congress is not a huge number when put in the perspective that the House has 435 members in it.

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

## CONCLUSION

Using the earlier literature on interest groups we are able to gain insight into what these types of groups hope to accomplish and how. Walker and Tierney provide us with the necessary definitions to help us understand that AAI is an ethnic citizen group that represents the Arab American community on Capitol Hill. This definition is important to us because many other types of interest groups exist that it could create confusion without a proper definition. Furthermore, from the other information gleaned in the literature review we have learned what motivates an interest group and what their political strategies might entail.

With this information in hand, we discover that AAI is an organization motivated to represent the interests of Arab Americans on issues of political importance to them, both foreign and domestic. Further, AAI being the de facto leader of Arab American interest groups, it is forced to take on issues it would prefer to avoid because their membership and events out of their control dictate that they work on issues they would rather not deal with.

When their influence is measured using the interviews and PAC contributions, we discover mixed results. The interviews with Congressional staffers suggest that AAI is a very ineffective interest group at delivering its message compared to other interest groups. Yet, the perceptions of the Congressional staffers are very different from each other. One was an ardently pro-Israel member, one was practically an isolationist, and the other two shared more moderate views, actually encouraging the concept that AAI should be more active. Yet, even with these different perspectives we discover a common

feeling, that AAI does not have that much influence on Capitol Hill because they don't get their message across.

Nonetheless, when their PAC contributions are examined, we find that those members of Congress who receive contributions are far more likely to side with AAI on issues of importance to them. This would suggest that AAI could gain further influence if they could raise the funds to compete financially with interest groups like AIPAC. Therefore, influence is possible if they could gather the financial resources. Increased monetary resources does not automatically mean they just have the money to compete with campaign contributions, but could also hire increased staff, which increases their ability to conduct an inside strategy. This strategy would mean more personal contacts with members of Congress to get their views better known on Capitol Hill.

AAI is an organization that faces an uphill battle in some respects. First, they are forced to take on issues that they don't want to constantly face, such as the Middle East. When they must constantly keep redirecting precious resources to other issues they lose ground on those issues of greater importance to the organization. Resources can be stretched only so far. Secondly, they face off against groups on the Israeli side who are better financed and have larger staffs. Finally, they must get their message to Capitol Hill in far more effective ways than mailings and faxes. Their lobbyists must become well-known fixtures of the Capitol Hill corridors if they are to become an organization with the political clout that is needed to be as effective as groups like AIPAC.

Something that has not been covered in this paper is a discussion of assimilation by Arab Americans into mainstream America. By assimilation, I mean the Arab American community joining into mainstream American political culture. This extends to

voting, the organization of interest groups, and creating a unifying political community. I would argue that this is also an issue that faces all ethnic interest groups before they can become a potent political force. The concept of assimilation, as I see it, is when an ethnic community becomes part of mainstream American politics and leaves their cultural political roots behind them. An example could include allowing women the right to vote if in their home country that would not have been possible.

The Arab American community is making significant inroads into assimilating into mainstream American political life. There are statistics available pointing out that the Arab American community does vote and actually does not overly lean to one political party or another.<sup>112</sup> What needs to happen is a mobilization on the part of the entire ethnic community to become actively involved in the political process. This does not mean that they must pick one party or another, but simply take the needed steps to make their voices heard at the ballot box. One last point to keep in mind is that it is possible for an ethnic community to become so assimilated that they lose their ethnic identity as a political force. Eventually all ethnic groups must walk that gray line between being assimilated enough to have influence and being so assimilated that they lose it.

To some extent, AAI's future prospects for increased influence depend on the external world that is out of their control. These events could include such possibilities as a change of U.S. policy in the Middle East or an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Even a major internal breakdown in the strength of Jewish interest groups, such as AIPAC, would be the kind of event that would help to increase the relative influence of AAI. Nonetheless, external events are not the only means of change for AAI.

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
<sup>112</sup> Arab American Institute, "Facts on Arab American Voters." Available from <http://www.aaiusa.org>; (Accessed November 14, 2002.) Internet.

As I stated earlier, a stronger lobbying presence on Capitol Hill will significantly improve AAI's level of influence and credibility. While AAI's immediate future may not be the brightest their future is not dim either. To some extent their future is in their own hands and the hands of their ethnic community who must continue to develop their political prowess to be politically influential.

Appendix A  
My Research Model



Figure 1: Research Model



Appendix B

VOTING AND PAC TABLES

Table 1  
USA PATRIOT Act

<b>Vote Summary</b>	<b>ALCPAC Contributions</b>					
		<b>Received Contribution</b>		<b>No Contribution</b>		<b>Total</b>
<b>Yes</b>	20	45%	337	87%	357	
<b>No</b>	23	52%	43	11%	66	
<b>No Vote</b>	1	2%	8	2%	9	
<b>Total</b>	44		388		432	

Notes: AAI views a “Yes” vote as unfavorable and a “No” vote as favorable to their policy position. Based on the 432 votes tallied we can assume that there were three open seats in the House. The bill passed the House of Representatives on 10/24/01.

Sources: Arab American Institute, Federal Elections Commission, and the U.S. House of Representatives.

Table 2  
“Solidarity With Israel” House Resolution 392

<b>Vote Summary</b>	<b>ALCPAC Contributions</b>					
		<b>Received Contribution</b>		<b>No Contribution</b>		<b>Total</b>
<b>Yes</b>	19	43%	333	86%	352	
<b>No</b>	13	30%	8	2%	21	
<b>Present</b>	9	20%	20	5%	29	
<b>No Vote</b>	3	7%	29	7%	32	
<b>Total</b>	44		390		434	

Notes: AAI views a “Yes” vote as unfavorable and a “No” or “Present” vote as favorable to their policy position. Based on the 434 votes tallied we can assume that there was one open seat in the House. The resolution passed the House of Representatives on 05/02/02.

Sources: Arab American Institute, Federal Elections Commission, and the U.S. House of Representatives.

Appendix C  
ALCPAC CONTRIBUTION LIST

**Alabama**

Earl F. Hilliard (D)

**California**

Barbara Lee (D)

Fortney Pete Stark (D)

Zoe Lofgren (D)

Adam H. Schiff (D)

Maxine Waters (D)

Dana Rohrabacher (R)

Darrell Issa (R)

**Georgia**

Cynthia A. McKinney (D)

**Illinois**

Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. (D)

Danny K. Davis (D)

Ray LaHood (R)

**Louisiana**

Christopher John (D)

**Maine**

John Elias Baldacci (D)

**Michigan**

Dave Camp (R)

Dale E. Kildee (D)

David E. Bonior (D)

Joe Knollenberg (R)

Lynn N. Rivers (D)

John Conyers, Jr. (D)

Carolyn C. Kilpatrick (D)

John D. Dingell (D)

**Mississippi**

Bennie G. Thompson (D)

**New Hampshire**

John E. Sununu (R)

**New Jersey**

Donald M. Payne (D)

**New York**

Gregory W. Meeks (D)

Jose E. Serrano (D)

Sherwood L. Boehlert (R)

Maurice D. Hinchey (D)

**North Carolina**

Eva M. Clayton (D)

Melvin L. Watt (D)

**Ohio**

Tony P. Hall (D)

Marcy Kaptur (D)

Dennis J. Kucinich (D)

Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D)

James A. Traficant, Jr. (D)

**Tennessee**

Harold E. Ford, Jr. (D)

**Texas**

Ron Paul (R)

Shelia Jackson Lee (D)

**Vermont**

Bernie Sanders (I)

**Virginia**

James P. Moran (D)

Rick Boucher (D)

Thomas M. Davis (R)

**West Virginia**

Nick J. Rahall, II (D)

**Totals**

Republican: 9

Democratic: 34

Independent: 1

Total: 44

Appendix D

HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD  
LETTER OF APPROVAL



Date: January 28, 2002

To: John Clark, Principal Investigator  
Robert Harbaugh, Student Investigator for thesis

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number 02-01-14

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "The Impact of the Arab-American Lobby on Congressional Decision-Making" has been **approved** under the **expedited** category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may **only** conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: January 28, 2003

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